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Abstract 
 
One notable feature about the debate between “liberal” and “political” constitutionalism 
has been its elite focus. The courts and the legislature are discussed in efforts to determine 
the appropriate role of each in processes of constitution-framing and changing. But this 
task is often set up implicitly as a zero-sum game. Although it might be claimed that 
citizens are tangentially relevant to this power struggle, a detailed account of whether 
citizens should, and how they might, play a direct role in constitutional authorship is 
seldom, if ever, placed on the table. This paper considers the elite orientation of this 
debate, questioning whether this is in normative terms acceptable, and in empirical terms 
credible, particularly as we consider how, over the past three decades, the referendum has 
emerged as an important vehicle for constitutional change in so many states. 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
One notable feature about the debate between “liberal” and “political” constitutionalism 
has been its elite focus. The courts and the legislature are discussed in efforts to determine 
the appropriate role of each in processes of constitution framing and changing. But this 
task is often set up implicitly as a zero-sum game. The executive might make an 
appearance in the debate, but the citizen rarely does, except by way of lip-service. 
Although it might be claimed that citizens are tangentially relevant to this power struggle—
as litigants or electors for example—a detailed account of whether citizens should, and 
how they might, play a direct role in constitutional authorship is seldom, if ever, 
addressed. In this paper, I will consider the elite orientation of this debate, questioning 
whether this is acceptable, in normative terms, and credible, in empirical terms, 
particularly as we consider how, over the past three decades, the referendum has emerged 
as an important vehicle for constitutional change in so many states. 
 
The debate surrounding political constitutionalism has indeed, as the organizers suggest, 
been framed in reactive, if not defensive, terms. The debate has been seen as a reaction to 
legal constitutionalism, liberal legalism or, what it is often called in the United Kingdom 
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(UK), common law constitutionalism.
1
 The constitutional debate has undoubtedly been 
enriched by the liberal versus political constitutionalism debate, not least by revitalizing 
analytical theory in the study of public law.
2
 This narrowing of the scope of political 
constitutionalism to be mainly reactive serves, somewhat ironically, both to over-
emphasize the importance of courts to contemporary political and constitutional practice, 
and to narrow down the potentiality of the political constitution as a vehicle for political 
debate, and more importantly as a mode of revitalizing popular democracy. 
 
As for the courts, constitutional lawyers can obsess about how liberal rights claims have 
superseded other constitutional priorities, and how courts have largely brought this 
change about (in doing so elevating their own constitutional position in relation to 
Parliament). In doing so, it is easy to miss the fact that court cases are still not, in the 
broader scheme of things, as significant a part of political or even constitutional decision-
making as this level of focus would sometimes suggest. 
 
Another consequence of this juridical orientation, and the narrowing down of the debate 
to a struggle about the relative appropriateness of Parliament and the courts to make 
constitutional decisions, is the insinuation, if not explicit conclusion, that constitutional 
change is, and should be, simply a war of the gods, fought out by representative (or not so 
representative) institutions, with the citizen playing the role of interested (or uninterested) 
onlooker.  
 
Of course, it is understandable that the debate should be elite-focused. After all, the 
system of government within the UK—and other countries where the liberal versus 
political constitutionalism debates are most heated—is both a representative system and 
one that accords a prominent role to judicial review. But I would submit that the exclusivity 
of the elite focus is still surprising for at least two reasons. First, at the level of normative 
theory, if political constitutionalism is, as is often claimed, inspired by and situated within a 
broader republican tradition,
3
 we might expect that political constitutionalists would 
remark more often about the degree of citizen engagement in constitutional processes.  
 
                                            
1 There are, I think, interesting and important distinctions to be found in the English tradition of the common law, 
and its complex relationship with the democratic imperative that undergirds the legitimacy of the UK Parliament, 
that can distinguish it in positive ways from the didactic zeal of liberal legalism’s methodological individualism, 
but space forbids such a discussion here. See Alison Young, Sovereignty: Demise, Afterlife or Partial Resurrection?, 
9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 163 (2011). 
2 See Martin Loughlin, Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25 O.J.L.S. 183 (2005); see also MARTIN 
LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW (2004); MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW (2010). This body of work is 
exempt, of course, from the criticism of narrowness of scope which we find in some work on political 
constitutionalism. 
3 This is particularly so in the UK. See, e.g., ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005).  
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Second, it is also notable that the neglect of a civic republican focus within these debates 
occurs in the face of evidence of a growing disaffection among citizens with how elite 
politics works. More strikingly, it serves to overlook the fact that citizens are beginning to 
play a growing and direct role in constitution-making and constitution-changing processes 
across many states, not least through the proliferation of the referendum. The acceptance 
of representative democracy as a synonym for democracy itself is the complacent 
assumption upon which the political versus liberal constitutionalism debate takes place. 
Increasingly, however, the automatic default position of constitutional decision-making as 
operating solely through representative institutions is being questioned. My work in recent 
times has focused on the constitutional referendum. Building upon this work, in this paper 
I would like to reflect upon direct democracy as an aspect of political constitutionalism; 
focusing not only upon the horizontal relationship between elite institutions, but also the 
vertical constitutional relationships both among citizens themselves and between citizens 
and the system of representative democracy within which they live.  
 
When we evaluate the growing phenomenon of citizen engagement in constitutional 
decision-making, we see that citizen engagement is in fact playing out against a dynamic of 
contemporary constitutionalism that is often overlooked in the political versus liberal 
constitutionalism debate, namely the malaise, or at least the perceived malaise, in how 
representative democracy in fact works today. And those who defend a political 
constitution, with Parliament at its core, have to confront the fact that the effectiveness of 
parliaments, and possibly even the legitimacy of parliaments, in making big decisions can 
be undermined by empirical evidence concerning the very efficacy of legislative, scrutiny 
and accountability, roles that legislatures are assumed to play. 
 
Ironically, this is a point often picked up most coherently by liberal constitutionalists. One 
of the more persuasive arguments for a prominent and active constitutional role for 
courts—by which is often meant an assertive judicial role in controlling the executive—is 
that parliament is not up to the job. But political constitutionalists rarely focus on 
Parliament and its operability.
4
  It is curious that among lawyers there is very little active 
research into how Parliament operates, and how the “representative political constitution” 
works in practice. 
 
The referendum complicates both the political versus liberal constitutional debate and our 
understanding of the political constitution. In light of this observation, first, I will outline 
what I mean by a proliferation of the referendum by explaining how and where the 
referendum is being extended, and how this process can be said to be “constitutional.” 
Second, I will determine how this can be accounted for. Is it the case that the failings of 
                                            
4 I make an exception here for Adam Tomkins and one or two others within the political constitutionalist tradition 
who do follow the logic of the argument that any defense of Parliament or parliaments hinges, at least to some 
extent, upon how well in practice they perform their constitutional functions. See id. 
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representative democracy in practice are in part fuelling this development? If so, does this 
phenomenon speak specifically to an ineffectiveness, democratic gap, or other deficiency 
in the “political” constitution? And third, given that referendums are reviving or 
proliferating particularly in the area of constitutional change, what is it about processes of 
constitutional change that lend themselves to the application of the referendum, and can 
this development be accommodated within a political conception of the constitution that 
is so often predicated upon the implicit assumption of an exclusively representative model 
of decision-making? 
 
B. The Proliferation of the Referendum in Processes of Constitutional Change 
 
Over the past few decades we have seen a proliferation in the use of the referendum in 
processes of major constitutional change across the globe. In the table below I set out a 
summary of how referendum use has grown in four main areas of constitutional practice. It 
is notable that many of these issues are of the most fundamental significance.  
 
4 types of referendum in the “new 
wave” 
Examples 
Founding of new states Post- USSR and SFRY 
Eritrea (1993), East Timor (1999), 
Montenegro (2006), South Sudan 
(2011) 
 
Creation and amendment of new 
constitutions 
Post- USSR and SFRY 
Iraq – ratification of the Constitution of 
2005  
Egypt – constitutional reforms 2011 
Sub-state autonomy  Spain  
United Kingdom 
European Union: accession and 
integration treaty-making processes 
2004: Malta; Slovenia; Hungary; 
Lithuania; Slovakia; Poland; Czech 
Republic; Estonia; Latvia 
2012: Croatia 
 
First, in the founding of new states:  The referendum was widely used in the early nineties 
in the break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and its use is now the default mechanism for the emergence 
of most new states as exemplified by Eritrea (1993), East Timor (1999), Montenegro (2006) 
and South Sudan (2011). Kosovo is a possible exception, but even here we saw unofficial 
referendums in the 1990s much like those in some other parts of the former Yugoslavia. 
Second, referendums were once very rarely used in the creation or amendment of 
constitutions. But again, throughout Eastern Europe and more recently in Iraq and Egypt 
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we see the referendum emerge both in application—in the founding of new 
constitutions—and as a promise within the text of these constitutions in anticipation of 
future amendment procedures. Third, a sub-set of number two, referendums have been 
used to establish complex new models of sub-state autonomy as we have seen in the UK 
and Spain. Fourth, we have also seen a major proliferation in referendum use in the 
accession to and the transfer of sovereign powers from European states to the European 
Union (EU). As an example, of the first fifteen countries to join the EU, only Ireland and 
Denmark held referendums to ratify the decision. Of the ten countries that joined the EU in 
2004, only Cyprus did not hold a referendum. We saw the trend continue in January 2012 
when the Croatians voted in a referendum for accession in 2013. 
 
The UK is a good example of how the referendum has evolved from a highly exotic 
constitutional option to one that is increasingly normalized within constitutional practice, 
as the next table demonstrates. 
 
I. Referendums in the United Kingdom 
 
Place Date Issue Turnout Result 
Northern Ireland 8 March 1973 Remain part of the UK  
 
58.7 Approved: 98.9 
Northern Ireland 22 May 1998 Belfast Agreement 81.1 Approved: 71.1 
Scotland 1 March 1979 Creation of a Scottish 
Assembly  
33 Approved: 52 
(did not meet 
threshold) 
Wales 1 March 1979 Creation of a Welsh 
Assembly 
58.8 Not approved: 79.7 
Scotland 11 September 1997 1. Creation of a Scottish 
Parliament. 
2. Devolution of limited 
tax-varying powers 
60.4 1. Approved: 74.3 
2. Approved: 63.5 
Wales 18 September 1997 Creation of a National 
Assembly 
50.1 Approved: 50.3 
England (London) 7 May 1998 GLA and Mayor  34.6 Approved: 72 
England (North 
East) 
4 November 2004 North East England 
regional assembly 
47.8 Not approved: 78 
Wales 3 March 2011 Devolution of further 
powers to the National 
Assembly 
35.4 Approved: 63.5 
Scotland Autumn 2014? Independence   
United Kingdom 5 June 1975 Continued EC membership 64.5 Approved: 67.2 
United Kingdom 5 May 2011 Electoral System: 
Alternative Vote 
42.2 Not approved: 67.9 
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Given that these processes involve the people directly in such fundamental decisions, it 
seems increasingly important to fit this fact, and the use of referendums specifically, within 
theories of political constitutionalism. As suggested in the introduction, it is curious that 
the political constitutionalist model, insofar as it reflects republican traditions, tends to 
focus upon what we might call elite republican theory.
5
 In considering the revival of the 
referendum and other avenues of renewed citizen engagement in politics, however, which 
often occur not only alongside, but in some ways largely detached from, mainstream 
representative models of democracy, we need to conceptualize constitutional events over 
the past two decades. The post-1989 world is one in which citizen-centered, or civic 
republican authorship in state-creation and constitution-framing has been, and in certain 
contexts, such as EU enlargement and integration, continues to be, a significant factor.  
 
In light of the empirical evidence for its growing prominence, is it surprising how popular 
engagement in general constitutional processes, and particularly the referendum, has been 
so neglected in debates about political constitutionalism. Especially because of the 
challenge popular engagement in general constitutional processes presents for the 
representative model of democracy upon which so many of the tenets of political 
constitutionalism are implicitly built. The main challenge that political constitutionalists 
throw at liberal legalism is its lack of democratic legitimacy. But, in some sense, it would 
seem to be the very democratic legitimacy of representative models of political 
constitutionalism that is being called into question by the rise of direct democracy. 
 
II. Direct Democracy in an Age of Instability 
 
How then do we explain the proliferation of the referendum? And can we set it against 
wider arguments concerning the malaise of contemporary constitutionalism? The reasons 
as to why the referendum has emerged as such a key player in contemporary 
constitutional practice are, of course, many and complex, so much so that lawyers are 
perhaps not best placed to assess them. But the “why” question invites speculation, 
particularly because some of the trends that intuitively seem to have influenced this 
phenomenon also speak to the health, or indeed infirmity, of contemporary democracy.  
 
It is notable that there are three ways in which the proliferation of constitutional 
referendums (across the four constitutional processes I have mentioned) are occurring. 
First, the increased application of ad hoc or discretionary referendums in states where the 
constitution does not require their use. An example is the United Kingdom, which hosted 
two referendums in 2011. One was a state-wide poll on the voting system. The other, in 
                                            
5 For a focus of a number of contemporary constitutional theorists (e.g. Tomkins, Bellamy), see PHILIP PETTIT, 
REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (2007); see also Hoi Kong, Towards a Civic Republican Theory 
of Canadian Constitutional Law, 15 REV. CONST. STUD. 249 (2011). 
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Wales, involved the devolution of further powers to the National Assembly. The United 
Kingdom has now committed to the possibility of further referendum use in both the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998
6
 and the European Union Act 2011.
7
 Another example is the 
Netherlands, which in 2005 conducted its first ever referendum on the draft European 
Union Constitutional Treaty. Second, is the growth in the number of constitutions that now 
mandate referendum use, a trend we find in the new orders emerging in Central and 
Eastern Europe after 1989. And third, the promotion of the referendum by international 
institutions as they intervene in post-conflict processes around the globe. 
 
In some respects, the rise of the referendum is clearly a product of circumstances. For 
example, one key driver was the break-up of multinational states coinciding with the 
collapse of communism in Europe. In this context, the referendum offered dissenting 
political actors a vehicle for popular revolt, legitimizing and, in due course, foreclosing acts 
of constitutional rupture through direct popular intervention. A common usage for the 
referendum over the past quarter of a century, therefore, has been in the creation of new 
states and their subsequent constitutions, as well as the move to liberal democracy by 
many of the former USSR’s satellite states. From 1989 to 1993 there were at least sixteen 
referendums in Yugoslavia.
8
 An additional six referendums were held in Central and 
Eastern Europe and twenty-five in the territory of the former Soviet Union.
9
  Of these 
thirty-one, twelve were on sovereignty or independence, seven on new constitutions or 
forms of government, and twelve dealt with policy matters.
10
  
 
Another originator of constitutional referendums has been European integration. The 
period since the early 1990s has also been one of fairly intense treaty-making within the 
EC/EU, especially since the constitutions of some member states—most notably Denmark 
and Ireland—in effect mandate referendums ahead of the ratification of such treaties. In 
this context, again, referendums emerge simply as the indirect result of other political 
processes. 
 
                                            
6 Northern Ireland Act 1998, 1998, c. 47, § 1(1) (U.K.) (“It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety 
remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people 
of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purpose of this section  . . . .”). 
7 European Union Act 2011, 2011, c. 12, § 2 (U.K.) (“A treaty which amends or replaces TEU or TFEU is not to be 
ratified unless . . . the referendum condition or the exemption condition is met.”). 
8 It is difficult to be too precise. As I have noted, the referendum was used as a political tool by rival political 
actors at this time and the use of unofficial polls by small regions proliferated. 
9 See Henry E. Brady & Cynthia S. Kaplan, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE 
WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 174, 180 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994). 
10 Id. 
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But these three factors do not tell the whole story. An increasing number of states, 
including those emerging by way of referendum in Central and Eastern Europe, have seen 
fit to include the referendum in new constitutions as a key instrument of constitutional 
amendment. In other words, the referendum was not only instrumentally useful in the 
overthrow of communism or the securing of independent statehood, it retained sufficient 
salience to be included in the post-revolutionary constitution. There are, therefore, several 
features which suggest that the growth of the constitutional referendum is not simply a 
short-lived consequence of a particularly intense period of “sovereignty politics.” First, is 
the very fact that they came to be seen as an essential part in almost every move to new 
statehood by a sub-state people (one notable exception is the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia when the parties could not agree on a referendum question).
11
 This can be 
contrasted with earlier periods of state-making after both World Wars I and II when the 
referendum was rarely used, even in the face of widespread empire collapse. This suggests 
that by the late 20th century, for the first time the referendum had become, for many, an 
automatic part of constituent constitutionalism and even of the constitutional amendment 
process. Second, another feature of the referendum revival is the influence of international 
actors in these processes. We see this in the international community’s norm-creation 
processes, particularly in Europe,
12
 and in intervention in the cases mentioned above. A 
third element is the application of the referendum by countries with little or no 
constitutional tradition of using the referendum, but that now seem increasingly inclined 
to turn to the referendum at important constitutional moments. The political capital to be 
made from demanding a referendum and the danger in denying one suggests that this 
development is not only a consequence of political maneuvering, but of the changing 
expectations of citizens; Jacques Chirac’s concession of a referendum on the draft 
Constitutional Treaty, ironically following Tony Blair’s earlier promise, is a notable example. 
 
It seems, therefore, that while remaining mindful of the historical contingency of much 
recent referendum use, we also need to locate the rise of the referendum within broader 
changes in contemporary democratic practice and critique. One trend that has been 
identified is the increasing sophistication of contemporary electorates through better 
education and access to information. Dalton has called this development “cognitive 
mobilization” and argues that it is leading to stronger popular pressure for a greater say in 
governmental decision making.
13
  
                                            
11 See Stephen White & Ronald J. Hill, Russia, the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The Referendum as a 
Flexible Political Instrument, in THE REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE 153, 157–60 (Michael Gallagher & Pier 
Vincenzo Uleri eds., 1996). 
12 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Code of Good Practice on Referendums, Study No. 
371/2006 (Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-
AD%282007%29008rev.aspx. 
 
13 See RUSSELL J. DALTON, CITIZEN POLITICS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY, AND FRANCE (2d ed. 1996).  
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If public demand is a factor, another reason for referendum proliferation may be 
increasing disaffection among voters towards conventional representative politics. Political 
scientists have documented evidence of a loss of public trust and efficacy within 
democracies.
14
 Mendelsohn and Parkin identify both cognitive mobilization and 
heightened skepticism as important factors behind the rise of “referendum democracy.”
15
 
In their analysis: “*i+t is . . . likely . . . that a shift in political attitudes has taken place, the 
effect of which has been to make citizens either more confident in their ability to make key 
policy decisions or less confident in the ability of their elected representatives to do so.”
16
 
  
Various trends seem to have heightened citizen dissatisfaction with representative 
government and these are of course familiar:  The elite monopolization of policy-making; 
the ever more efficient communications machinery of government that seems to be 
increasingly manipulative in “spinning” stories; the increased influence of big business in 
the political process; the hiving-off of government functions to technocratic and semi-
private agencies, with concomitant breaks in the chain of accountability; the declining 
respect for the standards of behavior of elected representatives; and the incongruous 
results within certain electoral systems which do not seem to reflect voter preferences. 
The parallel decline in levels of party membership and electoral turnout is therefore no 
coincidence. 
 
Globalization has also nourished citizen disaffection with mainstream politics as people see 
power move away from the state not just to supranational “constitutional” sites but also to 
private transnational corporations and structures. It seems, therefore, that the 
revitalization of direct democracy is in part a reaction not just to the declining standards of 
representative democracy, but also to its emasculation in a world where its capacity for 
power is diminishing. It is interesting that the ad hoc referendum has emerged particularly 
as a feature of the recent EU constitution-making process, but France and the Netherlands 
turned to direct democracy for the draft EU Constitutional Treaty, even though the 
decision to hold a referendum was within the discretion of the French president and not 
mandated by the constitution. The acts of rebellion we saw in the Dutch and French 
processes and in Ireland over the subsequent Lisbon Treaty also hint at a growing popular 
disquiet with the trajectory or at least the process of integration. 
 
Furthermore, it seems that technology has been, and is likely increasingly to be, a factor in 
demands for more direct democracy. Anthony Giddens has observed that “*t+he downward 
                                            
14 E.g., NEIL NEVITTE, THE DECLINE OF DEFERENCE: CANADIAN VALUE CHANGE IN CROSS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1996).  
15 See Matthew Mendelsohn & Andrew Parkin, Introduction, in REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES, AND 
DELIBERATION IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS 1 (Matthew Mendelsohn & Andrew Parkin eds., 2001). 
16  Id. at 6.  
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pressure of globalization introduces not only the possibility, but also the necessity of forms 
of democracy other than the orthodox voting process.”
17
 In his view, referendums are one 
of the “experiments with democracy” resulting from this by which government and citizens 
can “re-establish more direct contact” with one another.
18
 Certainly, with people taking 
part more and more in informal online polls, engaging more directly in politics, for example 
through social networking, blogging and micro-blogging, the notion that their only 
engagement in constitutional politics should come indirectly through periodic 
representative elections could appear increasingly incongruous. And it seems that the 
revival of the referendum is itself part of a broader confluence of demand and opportunity, 
leading to experiments that engage citizens through innovative constitutional processes 
such as citizens juries and citizens assemblies. The proliferation of the referendum, I would 
submit, should be seen in this light; that is, not necessarily as a short-term phenomenon, 
but potentially as but one aspect of a broader and potentially long-term move towards 
more direct forms of citizen engagement in constitutional matters, particularly as the 
technological facility to provide such engagement develops.  
 
C. Conclusion: Referendums and the Political Constitution 
 
Finally, it is useful to reflect upon the referendum’s implications for political 
constitutionalism, particularly if the referendum proves to be not only a fixed feature of 
constitutional democracy, but a growing one. One intuitive way to accommodate this 
development is to envisage the referendum as a supplement to the role of Parliament 
which remains the main focus for democratic constitution-making or change within the 
political constitution. This is very much how the referendum was presented in a House of 
Lords Constitution Committee Inquiry report into the Referendum within the UK 
Constitution in 2010.
19
 There, the referendum was treated with considerable skepticism, 
but its growing salience seemed to lead the Committee to conclude that it was better to 
make a virtue out of a necessity by thinking about which matters lend themselves most 
appropriately to the use of the referendum and how to best construct a fair referendum 
process.  
 
But at the same time, we should be alert to the fact that the referendum can carry very 
substantial risks to democratic constitutionalism itself. From the perspective of political 
constitutionalism, perhaps the most obvious risk is that of elite control, particularly the 
claim that the referendum is simply a mask for executive hegemony. By this argument, the 
                                            
17 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 75 (1998). 
18 See id.  
19 SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, REFERENDUMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2009-10, H.L. 99 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldconst/99/99.pdf. 
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referendum is a device that can be proposed by governments and controlled by 
governments in a way that bypasses both the courts and the legislature in order to secure 
the executive agenda. The referendum is attractive to executive bodies particularly 
because they are able to achieve their political goals by manipulating an unreflective and 
ill-informed electorate into voting for a particular proposition. In this context, the 
referendum threatens the legislature’s role within the political constitution by indirectly 
bolstering the executive. Referendums deployed, for example, by President De Gaulle in 
the 1950s and 1960s are frequently cited in this regard.
20
  
 
There is no doubt that there are very serious process problems in much of the referendum 
experience we are seeing around the world.
21
 It is also the case that referendums are 
increasingly influenced by external and international actors, particularly referendums on 
state-making—as we have seen in Eritrea, East Timor, Montenegro, and South Sudan.  
 
The referendum is a growing reality, and the option of simply dismissing it as 
undemocratic, although perhaps comforting, does not fulfill the important task to which 
the constitutional theorist must commit, which is to analyze the constitutional landscape 
as it is, not as we would like it to be. And the role for normative constitutional theory is 
surely, from constitution to constitution, to improve the workings of existing constitutional 
models, rather than simply to wish them away. In my broader work, I have confronted the 
elite control criticism by suggesting that it is at heart a criticism of the practice rather than 
the principle of referendum use. As such, I have asked if it might be overcome by effective 
process design.
22
 
 
It is also the case that civic republicans—committed to the goal of an active citizenry—may 
well conclude that when matters involving the very framing of a democratic system of 
government are at stake, the direct engagement of the people either supplementing, or 
even replacing, representative institutions is appropriate. This builds upon work within the 
republican revival of the 1980s that focuses upon constitutional politics as distinct from 
ordinary politics and in doing so stresses the desirability of engaging more overtly with 
ordinary citizens, particularly at the constitutional level per Ackerman’s distinction 
                                            
20 See generally ANTHONY HARTLEY, GAULLISM: THE RISE AND FALL OF A POLITICAL MOVEMENT (1972); SERGE BERSTEIN, THE 
REPUBLIC OF DE GAULLE 1958-1969 8–11 (Peter Morris trans., 1993); Guy Carcassone, France (1958): The Fifth 
Republic After Thirty Years, in CONSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 241 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 1988). 
21 For example, the farcical referendum held in Syria in 2012. See Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syria Approves New 
Constitution Amid Bloodshed, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/us-syria-
idUSL5E8DB0BH20120227 (noting that, even though “Syrian artillery pounded rebel-held areas[,] . . . President 
Bashar al-Assad's government announced that voters had overwhelmingly approved a new constitution in a 
referendum derided as a sham by his critics at home and abroad”). 
22 See STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN DELIBERATION (2012). 
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between “the will of We the People” and “the acts of We the Politicians.”
23
 It may well be 
that the distinction between ordinary and constitutional politics is also not accorded as 
much attention within mainstream republican thought as it might be. Again, this may be a 
reason for the republicans’ neglect of the need to engage the public, particularly at 
moments of constitutional decision-making. A second argument, which flows from the 
first, is that in such decisions, the very identity of the demos can be implicated; particularly 
when they involve truly fundamental or constitutive constitutional issues, such as the 
founding of a new state, the transformation of the constitution or even the transfer of 
sovereign powers beyond the state. This means that a constitution can come to embody 
the political selfhood of the people. In this sense, the “popular” constitution extends 
beyond the functional purpose of framing a system of government; it can take on a 
symbolic representational role, encapsulating the very identity of the people, while also 
embodying emblematically its collective settled will.
24
 In turn, individuals come reflexively 
to identify with one another through their shared commitment to this constitution. It is, 
therefore, also in this context of the polity-building or nation-building potential of 
constitutional law-making that we must address constitutional referendums. When 
referendums are used to make or re-create constitutions they can themselves take on a 
vital nation-building role. The task then becomes one of framing the referendum process in 
such a way that it facilitates the active and deliberative engagement of citizens, so far as 
possible.
25
 In light of these high stakes, from a civic republican perspective, there again 
appears to be a strong prima facie case for direct popular engagement. 
 
Therefore, if the democratic failings of referendum practice can be overcome, it may well 
be that these exercises, in generating the direct engagement of the citizen in moments of 
constitutional authorship, have the potential to help reinvigorate democracy itself. In any 
event, this is a debate that surely needs to take place within the political constitutionalist 
tradition, and yet it is one that is seemingly neglected. It may well be that this oversight is 
another unfortunate symptom of the fixation courts and judges have with political 
constitutionalism. 
 
                                            
23 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
24 Rosenfeld discusses how modernist constitutionalism has played the role of constructing a form of collective 
self that builds upon but is, in its unitary and unifying functions, also different from diverse pre-constitutional 
cultural and ethnic attachments. See MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELFHOOD, 
CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND COMMUNITY (2010).  
25 See TIERNEY, supra note 22, at 285–99. 
